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I introduce a microfounded model of campaign ¯nance with o±ce-seeking politi-
cians, a continuum of voters, and a large number of heterogeneous lobbies. Lobbies
make contributions to politicians according to a common agency framework. Politi-
cians use contributions to ¯nance their electoral expenditures. Voters are not fooled
by electoral expenditures: they are in°uenced in a way that is consistent with the
equilibrium behavior of lobbies and politicians. The model is used to: (i) determine
the relation between campaign spending and political deadweight; (ii) show the in-
formational value of lobbies' contributions; (iii) evaluate the welfare implications of
restricting campaign spending; and (iv) interpret the empirical ¯nding that cam-
paign expenditures have a very low e®ect on election outcome. One can say that this
model makes the best case in favor of campaign contributions. Nevertheless, under
reasonable parameter values, a ban on campaign contributions is welfare-improving.
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Money plays an increasingly important role in elections throughout the world. Candidates
are spending larger and larger amounts on campaign-related expenditures such as TV
commercials, billboards, rally organization, door-to-door propaganda, direct mailing, and
professional political consultants. In 1996, the average cost of a winning U.S. House race
was around $650,000 and the equivalent ¯gure for the Senate was above $4.5 million. In
Europe spending has been traditionally at lower levels, but in some countries it growing
very fast. In Britain, total spending by the two main parties has doubled from the 1992
election to the 1997 election to reach $75 million.
Campaign ¯nance is a hotly debated topic. People are generally uncomfortable with
the mixing of money and politics. They fear that wealthy lobbies can obtain favors from
politicians through implicit or explicit promises of campaign contributions. This fear is
reinforced by the fact that some of the biggest contributors are unpopular industries, such
as tobacco manufacturing. To respond to voters' concerns, most Western countries have
introduced forms of campaign regulation.1
Unfortunately, we lack the theoretical framework to evaluate the welfare e®ects of
campaign ¯nance regulation. As Austen-Smith [4], Morton and Cameron [26], La®ont and
Tirole [20, p. 634], and Baron [7] have stressed, we do not have a microfounded theory of
political competition which gives a role to campaign expenditures. Most of the existing
models assume that electoral spending in°uences voters in an ad-hoc way, while in order
to make welfare comparisons one needs to know the voters' primitives.2
In this paper I introduce a microfounded theory of campaign spending. There are
three types of agents: politicians, lobbies, and voters. I employ a retrospective model of
voting in which politicians maximize their chances of being re-elected. Voters are fully
rational. They are heterogeneous and care about policy and valence of the politician in
o±ce. Valence denotes politicians' personal attributes, such as competence or charisma,
which a®ect all voters in a similar way.
There are a large number of organized interest groups.3 Policy is multi-dimensional
1See Levitt [23] for a discussion of existing regulation in the US. In principle one may restrict candidates'
entries (campaign contributions) or candidates' expenditures (campaign spending), or both. The US
Supreme Court has ruled that limits on spending are uncostitutional because they constitute restrictions
to the right to free speech. In contrast, limits on spending are in place in most European countries.
2There are a few exceptions, which will be discussed in the Literature subsection.
3This assumption seems realistic. Schlozman and Tierney [31] report over 5000 interest groups with
paid personnel in Washington in 1981. Greenwood [15] reports more than 3000 groups with o±ces in
1but each lobby is interested only in a small subset of policy dimensions. Given, the large
number of lobbies, each lobby is small enough that the in°uence of its contributions on the
electoral outcome is negligible. Therefore lobbies' contributions are service-induced. They
o®er money to politicians in exchange for favors which take the form of policy positions
bene¯cial to lobbies.4
Asymmetric information plays a central role. Professional lobbyists are in a better
position than common voters to observe the valence of politicians. Lobbies take into
account information on valence when they make their contribution choices. They do not
do it because they care about valence directly, but because voters may end up ¯nding
out about the politicians' valence. From the viewpoint of lobbies, the return of a dollar
of contributions to a certain politician depends on the probability that the politician is
re-elected. A high-valence politician is a better bet than a low-valence politician. Hence,
lobbies are more willing to give to politicians they have positive information about.
Voters observe campaign expenditures and form beliefs about the valence of politicians.
I require voters' beliefs to be consistent with the equilibrium behavior of lobbies and
politicians. Campaign spending can in°uence voters only inasmuch as it brings them
information.
One can say that the present paper makes the best case in favor of campaign contri-
butions. All the assumptions made go in the direction of making campaign expenditures
useful to voters: voters are not fooled; lobbies have no market power; and politicians do
not pocket the contributions but only use them for informative purposes. One could have
assumed that, confronted with campaign advertising, voters act on impulse and then re-
gret it. Or that some large lobbies have bargaining power against single candidates. Or,
still, that contributions are actually just a form of corruption, with the connected wasteful
transaction costs.
It is therefore surprising that in this model, under reasonable parameteric assumptions,
a ban on campaign contributions improves voter welfare. The intuition for this result does
not have to do with the fact that campaign spending is a wasteful activity. Rather, it is
akin to other negative welfare results in signaling games, such as Akerlof's rat race and can
be sketched as follows. In equilibrium, a candidate who makes low campaign expenditures
is perceived as a candidate who could not get money from lobbies because he was perceived
as inept or uncharismatic. As this perception is correct in equilibrium, all good candidates
Brussels.
4The service-induced model has been shown to have a good predictive power by Snyder [32].
2are forced to sell out to lobbies. Under certain conditions (high informational asymmetry
between lobbies and voters), the cost to voters of the candidate's selling out is higher than
the expected informational bene¯t. In that case, if voters could pre-commit not to use
campaign spending as a signal of candidate quality, they would gladly do it. But, as this
commitment is not credible, there is scope for welfare-improving regulation.
The plan of this paper is as follows. The next subsection reviews the relevant literature.
Section 2 presents the model and discusses its main assumptions. In order to keep the
model tractable, I need to make simplifying assumptions on the role of challengers and
on the information of voters. However, the model captures crucial aspects of campaign
spending such as: voter information, incumbency advantage, value of insider information,
and concentration of lobbies' fundraising ability.
Section 3 deals with the supply-side of campaign money. The goal of the politician is
to collect a given amount of money (a war chest) with the lowest political cost possible
(deadweight cost). The game between the politician and the lobbies is modeled according
to the common agency framework introduced by Bernheim and Whinston [9]. As a result,
deadweight is determined as a function of desired war chest, concentration of lobbies'
fundraising abilities, and the lobbies' belief on the probability that the politician is re-
elected.
Section 4 looks at the interaction between politicians and voters given the supply func-
tion of contributions. Voters are required to interpret campaign spending in a consistent
way, that is, they cannot be `fooled' by politicians. With this requirement, I construct a
revealing equilibrium in which the amount of campaign spending fully reveals the politi-
cian's valence to voters. The game has other equilibria as well but they do not survive the
Intuitive Criterion re¯nement.
Section 5 analyzes the welfare properties of the revealing equilibrium in comparison with
the equilibrium that would arise if campaign spending (or contributions) were forbidden
by law. I identify a su±cient condition for campaign spending to decrease welfare. If
the precision of voter information is low enough, then voters are better o® if spending
is forbidden. When voters are poorly informed, campaign spending is useful because it
provides them with the information they lack. However, I show that the deadweight cost
associated with campaign spending is greater than the informational bene¯t voters receive.
This result may appear surprising in view of the fact that voters are fully rational. However,
it has a parallel in the negative welfare results of other signaling games such as Akerlof's
rat race.
3Section 6 uses the present model to interpret the empirical ¯nding that campaign spend-
ing has very little e®ect on electoral outcome. A low observed e®ectiveness of campaign
spending is shown to imply that campaign spending decreases voter welfare. Section 7
concludes.
Related Literature
This paper is closely related to two distinct strands of literature. The ¯rst is common
agency theory. Developed by Bernheim and Whinston [9] and Dixit, Grossman, and Help-
man [14] and applied by an increasing number of political economists, common agency
o®ers a general theoretical framework to study the strategic interaction between interest
groups and politicians. The theory (which will be brie°y reviewed in Section 3) provides
strong arguments in support of one type of equilibrium, called truthful. Assuming that
people play according to the truthful equilibrium, the theory yields sharp predictions on
the outcome of the game and supplies an algorithm to compute equilibrium contribution
schedules. Grossman and Helpman [16] use common agency to study a general model of
spatial voting with two candidates and two interest groups. The model allows politicians
to derive utility both from policy and from o±ce tenure and generates an endogenous dis-
tinction between electoral motive and in°uence motive. However, the existing applications
of common agency do not model voters' decision making or (as in the case of Grossman
and Helpman [16]) assume that voters are in°uenced by campaign spending in an ad-hoc
way.
The second strand is the industrial organization literature on commercial advertising
(Kihlstrom and Riordan [19] and Milgrom and Roberts [25]). Advertising is assumed to be
not directly informative. Consumers are a®ected not by its message, but by the amount
of money spent on it (advertising on mass media is the most visible and credible way of
burning money). In a world of asymmetric information between ¯rms and consumers, a
large amount of advertising by a ¯rm can be interpreted as a signal of some unobservable
characteristics of the ¯rm. For instance, a ¯rm that is launching a new product may want
to burn money in order to show its intention to stay in the market on the long-term. This
in turn signals to consumers that the ¯rm believes to have a high-quality product.
I adopt the spirit of the literature on commercial advertising in assuming that voters
(instead of consumers) interpret campaign expenditures (instead of advertising) in a way
that is consistent with the structure of the model. The consistency requirement does not
imply that each voter makes a complex inference every time he sees a political ad. It only
4means that voters as a body are not systematically fooled by campaign expenditures. The
justi¯cation for the use of a consistency requirement in the present model is similar to the
justi¯cation for the use of the rational expectation hypothesis in macroeconomics.
Two works go in the direction of microfounding campaign spending within spatial
voting: Austen-Smith [3] and Prat [30]. In Austen-Smith [3], voters observe candidates'
positions with a certain error, and campaign expenditures reduce the variance of that
error. Thus, spending is assumed to be directly informative. An equilibrium is derived in
which candidates' positions are a®ected by the desire of receiving contributions. However,
in reality most political advertising seem to contain little veri¯able information. Voters
appear to be in°uenced by campaign expenditures, even when they are clearly devoid of
any informational content (see the experiment conducted by Ansolabehere and Iyengar [2]).
In Prat [30], campaign expenditures do not have a direct informative value but they
are used as a signal of candidates' valence. However, Prat [30] assumes that there is only
one lobby. Besides the lack of realism, this is a signi¯cant limitation also because it puts
all the bargaining power in the hands of the lobby. Hence, welfare results may be skewed
on the negative side because the lobby is able to extract all surplus from the relation with
politicians. Instead, the present work combines common agency and signaling to build a
general model with a large number of heterogeneous lobbies.5
An entirely di®erent way of microfounding campaign expenditures is proposed in Austen-
Smith [5, 6]. Lobbies give contributions in exchange for access to politicians. Politicians
are not interested in campaign money per se. They only care about the information that
lobbies can provide them with. However, in the spirit of Crawford and Sobel's [12], the
extent of truthful information transmission is increasing in the preference congruence be-
tween a lobby and the politician. Campaign contributions signal preference congruence
and therefore induce the candidate to grant access to the lobbies that make them.
2 Model
The model introduced in this section includes features of spatial voting, retrospective
voting, and signaling games. In the spirit of retrospective voting, the timing of the game
is similar to Lohmann [24]. There are two terms. In the ¯rst term an incumbent (denoted
5See also Potters, Sloof, and van Winden [29] for a model of campaign expenditures as non-directly
informative. However, their model is not embedded in the standard spatial competition model: candidates
are modeled as selling unspeci¯ed favors.
5with I) is exogenously put in power. During the ¯rst term, lobbies o®er I monetary
contributions in exchange for favorable policy choices. Lobbies' o®ers will be modeled in a
common agency framework µ a la Bernheim and Whinston [9]. After observing the lobbies'
o®ers, I chooses a position, which she will not be able to modify in the future. As a result
of her policy choice, I collects campaign contributions which will form her war chest. In
the end of the ¯rst term, a challenger appears and spends her war chest on campaign
expenditures. Voters cast their ballot. In the second term, the election winner rules.
The model includes asymmetric information. I is characterized by a valence variable
(charisma, integrity, ability, etc.) which bene¯ts all voters independently of their political
opinions. The valence variable is perfectly observed by lobbies and by I herself but only
imperfectly observed by voters. Voters try to infer I's valence from the amount I spends
on her campaign. One may object that such a deductive reasoning puts an unrealistically
high burden on voters' reasoning ability. However, this inference need not be done in a
conscious way. It is su±cient that campaign expenditures in°uence voters in a way that is
consistent with the indirect informational content of such expenditures.
The present analysis focuses on two aspects: the competition among lobbies for political
favors and the signaling role of campaign expenditures. By necessity, other important
aspects of electoral competitions are left out of the analysis. In particular, the challenger
role is modeled in the simplest possible way.
Incumbent: In the ¯rst term, a politician is exogenously put in power. Her valence is
given by g+µ. g 2 < is observed by all players including the voters and represents personal
characteristics which can be veri¯ed (such as political record or performance in the ¯rst
term). Instead, µ 2 f0;hg is perfectly observed by lobbies and by the candidate and
imperfectly observed by voters. µ captures those personal characteristics which cannot
be veri¯ed (such as personal ability). I assume that the cases µ = 0 and µ = h are
equiprobable.
The policy space has n dimensions. I chooses p 2 <n. Examples of policy dimensions
are: tari® rate on textiles, amount invested in education, strictness of abortion rule, etc.
The choice of p is made in the ¯rst term and is valid for two terms. This assumption is
meant as a reduced form of a reputational model in which politicians face a cost if they
alter their policy positions signi¯cantly.
Voters: There exist a continuum of voters indexed by j 2 [¡t;t]n with t ¸ 0. Given two
vectors x = (x1;::: ;xn) and y = (y1;::: ;yn), let the Euclidean distance between them be
6denoted as kx ¡ yk =
pPn
i=1(xi ¡ yi)2. If I has valence µ, chooses p, and is re-elected,
Voter j receives a second-term utility
u
I
j(p;g;µ) = g + µ ¡ kp ¡ jk:
Thus, all voters equally bene¯t from valence but they have di®erent opinions on policy.6
One may doubt that utility is separable in policy and valence. A left-wing voter may
prefer an inept right-wing politician to an e®ective right-wing politician because the latter
is more likely to live up to her promises and pass right-wing legislation. Still, an inept
politician creates pure ine±ciencies which are costly to all citizens. I assume that this
generalized ine±ciency e®ect dominates the partisan e®ect.
Lobbies: Both in the US and in the EU, there exist a very large number of organized
lobbies. Typically each lobby cares only about a limited set of issues. For instance, a group
representing textile producers will try to in°uence tari® rates on textile products but will
have no interest in the strictness of abortion rules. Viceversa an anti-abortionist lobby will
have no concern for textile tari®s. I capture this specialization phenomenon by assuming
that each lobby cares only about one policy dimension.7
However, on each policy dimension there is usually more than one active lobby. To keep
things simple, I assume that on each dimension exactly two lobbies are active and they
have opposite interests. Each lobby minimizes the Euclidean distance from a bliss point,
which is -1 for one lobby and +1 for the other. Hence, on dimension i, there is a \right"
lobby Ri with payo® (net of contributions) ¡kR
i j1 ¡ pij and a \left" lobby Li with payo®
¡kL
i j1 + pij.8 The parameters kR
i and kL
i are both positive and will be discussed shortly.
Let ² denote the probability of I winning the race, estimated by lobbies. I will discuss
later how ² is determined. The right lobby on i o®ers contribution schedule cR
i (p), while
the left lobby on i o®ers contribution schedule cL
i (p). Contributions must be nonnegative.
6 As is well known, generically a voting equilibrium does not exist on a multi-dimensional policy space.
However, the combination of the assumptions that voters are uniformly distributed on a hypercube and
that their loss function is the Euclidean distance guarantees that a voting equilibrium exists and that the
median voter theorem applies (Davis, DeGroot, and Hinich [13]).
7Lobbies represent voters, but only along one dimension. For instance, one voter may be represented
on a dimension by his trade union, on another dimension by his religious a±liation, and yet on a third
dimension by a car drivers' association. Conversely, a trade union may have religious members and non-
religious members, and car lovers as well as bike lovers.
8The labels \left" and \right" have no relation with ideological positions. A left lobby on policy i has
nothing in common with a left lobby on policy j 6= i.












i (1 + ²)j1 + pij ¡ c
L
i (pi) (2)
The k-parameters play a crucial role in this analysis. They capture the importance
of each lobby. A crucial aspect of interest group politics (See Lehman Schlozman and
Tierney [31, Chapter 4]) is that lobby membership is not uniformly distributed across
voters. Some segments of voters are overly represented in lobbying. This may be due to
institutional settings (people who are in contact for other reasons are more likely to form a
lobby) or to informational constraints (wealthy, better educated people are more likely to
form a lobby). Thus the k-parameters can be viewed as the fundraising abilities of single
lobbies.9
Given the contribution schedules of all lobbies, I selects p¤ 2 < and receives a =
Pn
i=1[cR
i (p) + cL
i (p)]. a represents I's war chest.10
Voter Information: At the election voters have imperfect information. I make the
simplest possible assumption: with probability ½ voters have full information, that is, they
observe a, p, and µ. With probability 1 ¡ ½ they have no direct information, that is, they
only observe a. In that case, voters form belief ¯(a) on the characteristics of I. ¯(a) is
determined in equilibrium.
Challenger: At the end of the ¯rst term a challenger appears. As the challenger has
not been in o±ce, he has not had the opportunity to collect a war chest. Therefore, the
challenger makes zero campaign expenditures. I also assume that lobbies do not receive
any insider information about the challenger. Thus, the expected valence of the challenger
is common knowledge among all players and is given by expected valence x ´ E[gc + µc].
The assumption that only the incumbent can receive money is made for analytical sim-
plicity. Of course, in reality, challengers do receive contributions and make expenditures.
Nevertheless, incumbent spending dwarfs challenger spending. In the US, in more than
9Indeed (1) and (2) could be rewritten with k's at the denominator of contributions rather than as
multiples of the bene¯t. The results will be unchanged.
10In reality, lobbies have two instruments to in°uence policy: campaign contributions and information
provision. As Bennedsen and Feldman [8] have shown, the two instruments are not independent: the ¯rst
tends to crowd out the second. However, this paper will only focus on the ¯rst instrument.
8half of the districts the incumbent spends ten times more than the challenger.11
The challenger selects a policy vector pc. Voter j casts his vote for the incumbent if
and only if
g + E[µ ¡ kp ¡ jk] ¸ x ¡ E[kpc ¡ jk]
Lemma 1. pc = 0 is a dominant strategy for the challenger.
Proof. The challenger is elected if and only if the median voter votes for him (See Foot-
note 6). Hence, he maximizes the probability of being elected by selecting the median
voter's ideal policy.
Then, the incumbent is elected if and only if
g + E[µ ¡ kpk] ¸ x
During the ¯rst term, the identity of the challenger is not known. I and the lobbies
have common prior on x given by the cumulative distribution F(x) continuous and with
full support on [0;1). F(x) is assumed concave in x, which means that the frequency of
challengers is decreasing with quality. The average quality of challengers may be lower,
equal, or higher than the average quality of incumbents.
Probability of Election: From the preceding discussion, it follows that the ex ante
probability of election for I is
e(g;µ;p;a) = ½F(g + µ ¡ kpk) + (1 ¡ ½)F(g + ¯(a)) (3)
that is, with probability ½, I faces fully informed voters, while, with probability 1¡½, she
faces voters who only observe a. Clearly, I will face a tradeo® between increasing her war
chest a and keeping p not too far away from the median voter. I has no policy preferences
and chooses the policy vector p in order to maximize her probability of election.
11Prat [30] allows for contributions to both candidates (but with one lobby only), which adds additional
negative welfare e®ects due to the strategic interaction between candidates. Morton and Myerson [27]
show that, when both candidates can receive money and there are multiple lobbies, a coordination game
among lobbies creates a generalized indeterminacy in the identity of the election winner.
9Deadweight Cost: The term kpk represents the Euclidean distance of the policy selected
by I from the median voter's ideal policy. I faces a tradeo® with regards to kpk. On
one hand, she wants to minimize it in order to please the median voter. On the other
hand, she may want to deviate from kpk = 0 in order to receive higher contributions
from lobbies. The term kpk can be seen as the deadweight cost of campaign contributions,
and will often be denoted with D. If campaign contributions are forbidden, I chooses
D = 0. Hence, a deviation from 0 is only motivated by the desire of attracting higher
contributions. Campaign contributions also provide an informational bene¯t to voters.
The welfare analysis of Section 5 will explore the tradeo® between the informational bene¯t
and the deadweight cost of campaign contributions.
Timing of the Race: To summarize:
1. First Term: The incumbent I is in o±ce. Everybody observes g. Lobbies and I




i (p) + cL
i (p)].
2. Electoral Campaign: A challenger with expected valence x appears. I uses a for
campaign expenditures. With probability ½ voters are perfectly informed. With
probability 1 ¡ ½ they only observe a. Voters cast their ballot.
3. Second Term: If I is elected, p is implemented. If C is elected, 0 is implemented.
Payo®s are made.
3 The Supply of Campaign Funds
This section deals with the supply of campaign contributions. It is only a partial equi-
librium analysis in which the incumbent's probability of election is taken as exogenous.
Voters are not in the picture yet. The next section will consider the equilibrium of the
whole model.
Each lobby o®ers a contribution schedule to I. A lobby interested in dimension i o®ers
a payment contingent on pi. This payment will also depend on the estimated probability
that I is re-elected. As there are a large number of lobbies,
Assumption 1. Each single lobby takes I's probability of re-election as given.
10As all lobbies have the same information, they estimate the same probability of re-
election, which we denote with ². Clearly, ² will depend on all the variables lobbies can
observe, that is, g and µ.
Consider an incumbent with an estimated re-election probability ² who wants to raise
a campaign war chest a. From (3), her goal is to minimize the Euclidean distance of p
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We suppose that contribution schedules are continuous and di®erentiable (later, it will be
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L
i (pi)] ¡ a
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(5)
Each single lobby takes the contribution schedules of other lobbies and the Lagrange






i (pi) + c
L
i (pi)] (6)
Lobbies on i know that I gets a marginal bene¯t ¸ for each dollar of contributions from
lobbies on i. This marginal bene¯t is independent of the contribution schedules of lobbies
on i. If I reduces the amount of money she gets from dimension i, she can increase the
amount she get from all other lobbies by an in¯nitesimal amount. As there are a large
number of lobbies and contribution schedules are assumed to be di®erentiable, this has an




i is equivalent to minimizing kpk. I use the former because it simpli¯es
algebra.
13We must also exclude the extreme case in which d
dpicR
i (pi) + cL
i (pi) = 0 for all dimensions and all
policies. To do that, it is su±cient to assume that there exist some dimensions on which kR
i 6= kL
i .
































The game played between lobby Ri and lobby Li according to (7) and (8) is a common
agency problem. Common agency has been studied by Bernheim and Whinston [9] and
by Dixit, Grossman, and Helpman [14]. There are several principals denoted with m 2 M
(which correspond to lobbies in this model) and one agent (which corresponds to the
incumbent). The agent must choose an action y out of a set of feasible actions Y . Principal
m o®ers a contribution schedule cm : A ! [0;1). The principals' payo® is assumed to be
separable in money and action. Thus, m chooses cm in order to maximize fm(y) ¡ cm(y),
where f(¢) is the gross utility to m from action y. The agent's payo® depends on the total
amount of contributions received and on the action chosen. In the present analysis, the
payo® can be assumed to be separable in money and action. Hence, let the agent's payo® be
f(y)+
P
m2M cm(y). The game is played in two stages. First, all principals simultaneously
and noncooperatively choose contribution schedules. Second, the agent chooses an action
y and receives the contributions corresponding to y.
Common agency games tend to have multiple equilibria. However, Bernheim and Whin-
ston [9] show that only one type of equilibria is coalition-proof. This type of equilibrium
emerges when all principals use truthful contribution schedules. Principal m plays a truth-
ful contribution schedule if cm(¢) satis¯es for all y 2 Y
cm(y) = max(0;fm(y) ¡ ¼m)
where ¼m is a constant. A truthful contribution schedule is called \truthful" because
it follows the shape of the principal's gross payo® bar the constant factor ¼m and the
satisfaction of the nonegativity constraint. Bernheim and Whinston show that, for any
14For simplicity, I assume that the bliss points of the two lobbies (-1 and 1) are never reached, so that
the problem is equivalent to a problem in which the right lobby maximizes pi and the left lobby minimizes
pi.
12strategy played by the other principals, the set of best responses of principal m always
contains a truthful schedule. Thus, each principal, can without loss restrict her attention
to truthful schedules.
Thus, there are two reasons for thinking that truthful equilibria are more plausible
than non-truthful equilibria: ¯rst, principals can focus without loss on truthful schedules;
second, an equilibrium is coalition-proof if and only if it is truthful. Therefore, in this
paper I will only consider truthful equilibria.
Lobbies on i o®er truthful contribution schedules:
c
L
i (pi) = max(0;k
L





i (pi) = max(0;k
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Lemma 2. Given ¸ > 0 and ², in the common agency game de¯ned by (7) and (8), there
exists a unique truthful equilibrium. In the truthful equilibrium, contribution schedules are








































We shall now combine Lemma 2 and minimization problem (4), to determine the policy
vector p¤ that is optimal for I given a and given the contribution schedules of all lobbies.














i )2 + (kR
i )2]
13Proposition 1 gives an expression for the minimal deadweight cost associated with ² and
a under the assumption that lobbies o®er truthful contribution schedules. Let us brie°y
discuss the comparative statics of D
The fact that D is increasing in a is not surprising. If I has to give out D0 to obtain
a0, then she will have to give out D00 ¸ D0 to obtain a00. D is linear in a because the payo®
functions of both lobbies and voters are linear in the Euclidean distance from their ideal
policy. With other functional speci¯cations, this relation need not be linear.
An important result is that D is decreasing in the estimated probability of election
². With a higher ², lobbies believe that it is more likely that I's policy vector p will be
implemented for a second term. Therefore, they are willing to make higher contributions
in order to steer p to their advantage. As we will see, ² depends positively on µ. Hence,
given a, a candidate with µ = 1 incurs a lower deadweight cost than a candidate with µ = 0
in order to raise a. This will be the mechanism through which the amount of campaign
contributions that one candidate has collected signal the candidate's µ to voters.
Finally, D is linear in ±. Recall that the k's represent the fundraising abilities of each
single lobby. Then, ± can be seen as a concentration index of fundraising abilities. There are
two extreme cases. If, on every policy dimension, both lobbies have the same fundraising
ability, then ± = 0. This is the best-case scenario for the incumbent. She collects the
highest amount of contributions by choosing the median voter's ideal policy. The other
extreme case occurs if on each dimension one lobby has no fundraising ability, which is as
if only one lobby were active on each dimension. Let us assume without loss of generality
that only right lobbies are active. Then, ± = 2 pPn
i=1)(kR
i )2. This is the worst-case scenario
for the incumbent. Each lobby is a monopolist on its own dimension. Hence, for a given a,
the deadweight cost increases as fundraising ability is more unequally distributed on each
dimension.
4 Equilibrium on the Contribution Market
After examining the supply side of campaign ¯nance, we turn to the demand side and
we ¯nd the equilibrium of the whole model. The incumbent wants money to be able
to in°uence voters. Voters are in°uenced by campaign expenditures because they take
them as signals that the incumbent has a high valence. This section makes this argument






eµ(a) = ½F(g + h ¡ Dµ(a)) + (1 ¡ ½)F(g + ¯(a)) (12)
The function Dµ(a) comes from Proposition 1 and represents the deadweight cost I must
incur to collect a from lobbies if she is of type µ. The function eµ(a) comes from (3) and
gives the election chance of I if she collects a war chest a and if her type is µ. ¯(¢) and ²
are beliefs and will be determined in equilibrium.
Let us de¯ne a revealing equilibrium as < a0;a1;²0;²1;¯(¢) > such that
a0 6= a1; (13)
and, for µ 2 f0;1g,
aµ = argmaxaeµ(a); (14)
²µ = eµ(aµ); (15)
¯(aµ) = µ + Dµ(aµ): (16)
Condition (13) guarantees that in equilibrium incumbents with µ = 0 are separated from
incumbent with µ = h. (14) says that I maximizes her election chances given the beliefs of
voters and lobbies. (15) and (16) require beliefs to be consistent. If these two conditions
were not satis¯ed in equilibrium, it would mean that some agents in the model are system-
atically fooled. In particular, (15) requires the lobby's estimated probability of election
to be consistent with the actual probability of election, while (16) implies that voters are
in°uenced by campaign spending only to the extent that it transmits indirect information
about I's type.
By combining (14) and (16), we immediately see that
Lemma 3. In a revealing equilibrium: (i) e0(a1) · e0(a0); (ii) e1(a1) ¸ e1(a0); and (iii)
a1 > a0.
Conditions (i) and (ii) are familiar incentive-compatibility constraints. Condition (iii)
guarantees that the high-type takes a more costly action (in terms of deadweight) than
the low type. If this were not the case, then the low type would gain by pretending to be
a high type, which would violate (i).
15To ¯nd a revealing equilibrium we guess the form of voters' beliefs and we construct the
equilibrium from there. The resulting equilibrium has the property of achieving revelation





¡D0(a) if a < a¤
h ¡ D1(a) if a ¸ a¤
(17)
for some a¤ > 0. In other words, if total campaign expenditures are below a¤, voters believe
that I has µ = 0, while, if expenditures are at least a¤, they believe that µ = h.15 With this
type of beliefs, any a 2 (0;a¤) is dominated by a = 0 and any a 2 (a¤;1) is dominated
by a = a¤. Therefore, we can restrict our attention to a 2 f0;a¤g. The three conditions of
Lemma 3 become two: e0(a¤) · e0(0) and e1(a¤) ¸ e1(0). However, we will assume that
the former condition holds as an equality (this assumption is motivated in footnote 16).
Thus, the conditions for a revealing equilibrium are:
e0(a
¤) = e0(0) (18)
e1(a
¤) ¸ e1(0) (19)
By combining (12) and (17) and noticing that D0(0) = D1(0) = 0, we have
e0(0) = F(g); (20)
e0(a
¤) = ½F(g ¡ D0(a
¤)) + (1 ¡ ½)F(g + h ¡ D1(a
¤)); (21)
e1(0) = ½F(g + h) + (1 ¡ ½)F(g + h ¡ D1(a
¤)); (22)
e1(a
¤) = F(g + h ¡ D1(a
¤)): (23)
e0(0) and e1(a¤) are probabilities of election if I behaves according to her type. e0(a¤) is
the probability of election of a low type who collects a war chest a¤ in order to be perceived
as a high type. With probability ½ voters will call her blu®, otherwise they will fall for it.
e1(0) is the probability of election for a high type who does not bother to collect campaign
funds. With probability ½ voters will ¯nd out her valence anyway, otherwise they will think
she is a low type.
Now, we are ready to prove that the incentive-compatibility constraint for the low
type (18) implies the incentive-compatibility constraint for the high type (19). This is a
standard result in signaling games, but as the present game di®ers from games analyzed
in the literature, a proof is needed:
15This type of beliefs is common in the industrial organization literature on advertising with rational
voters. See, for instance, Milgrom and Roberts [25].
16Lemma 4. (18) implies (19).






This is a single-crossing condition. The policy cost of additional campaign ¯nance is higher
for the lower type, which explains why Lemma 4 holds.







However, by (15), lobbies' belief must be consistent. Therefore,
D0(a
¤) =













+ (1 ¡ ½)F(g + h ¡ D1(a
¤)) (25)
in which the only unknown is D1(a¤). Let the minimum positive solution of (25) be denoted
with D¤. A ¯xed point argument on D1(a¤) = 0 and D1(a¤) = h shows that D¤ exists.
By using Proposition 1, we have that a¤ =
(1+²1)D¤
± , which, by (15), implies that
a
¤ =
(1 + F(g + h ¡ D¤))D¤
±
(26)
The preceding discussion is summarized in:
Proposition 2. There exists a revealing equilibrium in which a0 = 0 and a1 = a¤, where
a
¤ =
(1 + F(g + h ¡ D¤))D¤
±
; (27)









+ (1 ¡ ½)F(g + h ¡ D
¤) (28)
To interpret Proposition 2, recall that voters are informed with probability ½ and un-
informed with probability 1¡½. If voters turn out to be informed, a high-type incumbent
has a higher election chance than a low-type incumbent. For this reason, lobbies are more
17willing to contribute to a high-type incumbent, which means that a high-type has a lower
deadweight cost than a low type for each level of campaign contributions. If voters stay
uninformed, then they are in°uenced by the level of campaign expenditures. Only if the
level is above the threshold a¤, voters believe that the incumbent is a high type. This
threshold is high enough that a low-type incumbent is indi®erent between collecting a¤ or
making no expenditures at all. Instead, a high-type incumbent has a strict bene¯t from
collecting a¤.
The equilibrium of Proposition 2 is not the only sequential equilibrium of the game
considered here. In particular, there is a pooling equilibrium in which voters refuse to
draw inferences from campaign expenditures and therefore the incumbent has no reason
to make any. In a pooling equilibrium, when voters are uninformed, they do not learn the




h for a 2 [0;1): (29)
Suppose that voters were to observe an incumbent with a positive level of campaign ex-
penditures. According to belief (29), they should conclude that a positive expenditure can
come with equal probability from a low-type or from a high-type.
To check whether the pooling equilibrium is plausible, one can apply the well-known In-
tuitive Criterion by Cho and Kreps' [11] which checks the plausibility of out-of-equilibrium
beliefs. Suppose the incumbent makes a positive level of campaign expenditures a0. Voters
should ask themselves what she is trying to signal. Suppose that, if voters believed that
a0 could only come from a high-type, then in fact a high type would be better o® with
a = a0 rather than with a = 0, while a low type would be worse o® with a = a0 than with
a = 0. Then, voters should conclude that only a high type may want to undertake such
a deviation. In this case, one would say that the pooling equilibrium does not survive the
Intuitive Criterion. Indeed, I prove that this is the case.
Proposition 3. The pooling equilibrium does not survive the Intuitive Criterion.
Hence, the fully revealing equilibrium of Proposition 2 appears to be more robust than
the pooling equilibrium. From this point on, I will focus exclusively on the revealing
equilibrium.16
16 There are other revealing equilibria besides the one in Proposition 2, which involve higher expenditure
levels than a¤. From the analysis on pooling equilibria, it is immediate to see that also these other revealing
equilibria are killed by the Intuitive Criterion. Suppose that voters believe that a candidate is a high type
only if she spends at least a0 > a¤. Then, with those beliefs, in equilibrium only a = 0 and a = a0 are
played. But, a deviation to a 2 (a¤;a0) can only come from a high type.
18Let us conclude the section with some comparative statics. In particular, it is inter-
esting to see how an increase in voter information ½ a®ects deadweight and advertising
expenditures.
Proposition 4. An increase in ½ causes a decrease in D¤ and in a¤.
Both deadweight cost and campaign expenditures go down as voters become more
informed. A higher probability that voters will be informed reduces the incentive for a low-
quality candidate to mimick a high-quality candidate and the latter can signal his type with
a lower war chest. As a result, the high-quality candidate needs to make less concessions
to lobbies. Accordingly, countries where voters are highly informed will have low campaign
expenditures. This prediction appears to be con¯rmed in Europe. Campaign expenditures
are extremely low in the Netherlands and in Scandinavian countries, where the combination
of small populations and high education levels make voter involvement notoriously high.
On the other hand, campaign ¯nance appear to be an important phenomenon in Italy,
France, and, increasingly, Britain { three larger countries with a less informed electorate.17
5 Voter Welfare
We would like to understand whether campaign spending is bene¯cial or detrimental for
voters. With campaign spending, I have argued that a revealing equilibrium is likely to
arise. Voters learn the type of the candidate even when they are uninformed, but high-
type candidates deviate from the median voter's ideal policy in order to secure campaign
contributions from lobbies. Without campaign spending, the incumbent cannot signal her
type. With probability 1 ¡ ½ voters ignore µ. On the other hand, the incumbent always
choose the median voter's ideal policy.
Voter welfare is de¯ned here as the integral of utility over the continuum of voters.
As voters are symmetrically distributed, maximizing voter welfare is then equivalent to
maximizing the median voter's utility. Thus, in this section I will focus exclusively on the
median voter's utility.18
17Kaid and Holtz-Bacha [18] provide a comparative analysis of the use of political advertising in the US
and several European countries.
18If voters were not symmetrically distributed or if the social planner cared more about some voters than
others, then the bias introduced by campaign advertising could actually be welfare improving because it
would correct the distortion created by the median voter's dictatorship. Of course, the bias could also go
in the opposite direction. So the symmetry assumption is an agnostic compromise.
19Two remarks are in order with respect to the de¯nition of welfare. First, the de¯nition
does include the utility of lobby members. They are counted in the same way as other
voters. Second, the de¯nition does not include the direct ine±ciency arising from campaign
spending per se. Electoral expenditures are unproductive and can use scarce resources such
as labor or paper. This additional cost should be counted in the welfare measure, but is
not. Thus, if we ¯nd that welfare is higher when campaign spending is prohibited, this
result holds a fortiori if we include the direct ine±ciency arising from campaign spending.
Let wµ be the median voter's expected utility if it is known that the incumbent has zero
deadweight and type µ. w0 and w1 depend on the distribution of the challenger's quality
x:
w0 = Ex[max(g;x)];
w1 = Ex[max(g + h;x)]:
Similarly, let ¹ w be the median voter's expected utility if voters do not know what type the
incumbent is (neither directly because they are informed nor indirectly because they infer
it from campaign expediture):




Finally, let ~ w1 be the median voter's expected utility if it is known that I is a high type
who has incurred a deadweight cost D¤:
~ w1 = Ex[max(g + h ¡ D
¤;x)]:
Let W be the median voter's ex-ante utility, that is, his expected utility before receiving
any information about the incumbent. Let Wn denote the case in which campaign spending











+ (1 ¡ ½) ¹ w; (30)








By putting together (30) and (31) we have:
20Proposition 5. Wn > Ws if and only if
1
2







Proposition 5 has an intuitive meaning. The left-hand side of (32) represents the
expected bene¯t for the median voter of allowing campaign spending, while the right-hand
side represents the expected cost. The expected cost is the di®erence between having a
high-type incumbent with no deadweight cost and a high-type incumbent with D¤. The
1
2 indicates that this cost is not sustained when the incumbent is low-type. The expected
bene¯t comes from the ability of discriminating between high-types and low-types. It is
immediate to see that it is always positive. The bene¯t is pre-multiplied by (1¡½) because
if voters receive direct information, they can discriminate between high-types and low-types
anyway.
Both sides of (32) are decreasing in the probability voters are informed: ½. The ex-
pected cost is decreasing because D¤ is decreasing in ½. The expected bene¯t is decreasing
because campaign spending is useful only when voters do not receive information directly.
Therefore, Proposition 5 does not tell us whether the inequality Ws > Wn is more likely
to hold for low ½'s or for high ½'s. However, we can prove the following:
Proposition 6. For any g and h, if ½ is small enough, then Wn > Ws.





















½!0 ~ w1 > 0: (33)
Consider (28) and take the limit as ½rightarrow0. The left-hand side is unchanged. In-
stead, the right-hand side tends to F(g + h ¡ D¤). Hence, we have
lim
½!0F(g + h ¡ D
¤) = F(g)
lim
½!0g + h ¡ D
¤ = g
lim
½!0Ex[g + h ¡ D
¤;x] = Ex[max(g;x)]
lim
½!0 ~ w1 = w0:
Thus, (33) reduces to ¹ w > w0, which is true because h > 0.
21Proposition 6 identi¯es a su±cient condition for campaign spending to decrease welfare.
If voters are almost completely uninformed, then welfare is higher if campaign spending
is forbidden. This may seem surprising because campaign spending brings the highest
informational bene¯t when voters are the least informed. However, also the deadweight
cost associated with campaign spending is at its highest when voters are least informed.
If voters are unlikely to get a direct signal about the incumbent's type, then a low-type
incumbent has a high incentive to mimick a high type. In the limit, as ½ tends to zero, the
bene¯t from campaign spending is equal for a low type and for a high type. To separate
herself from the low type, the high type must \burn" through deadweight cost the whole
bene¯t of being revealed as a high-type, that is, h.
One may wonder about the rationality of voters: if campaign spending reduces their
welfare, why don't they just refuse to listen to it? Unfortunately, they cannot commit
before the election to disregard electoral advertising. Once the the incumbent has sustained
the expenditure, it is in the interest of voters to extract as much information as they can.
This negative welfare e®ect has a parallel in other signaling games. In the famous rat
race, Akerlof [1] considers a principal who hires two agents of unknown type. After, say,
six years, the principal must decide to promote only one of the two agents to a higher-
paying job (notice the similarity with a ¯rst-past-the-post election). The principal cannot
observe the amount of e®ort agents put in their work but only their outputs. Clearly, the
optimal strategy for the principal is to promote the agent with the higher output. Knowing
that, agents will work very hard in the ¯rst six years { harder than it is socially e±cient.
Therefore, to accept the job in the ¯rst place, agents will demand a high salary. Under
certain conditions, the principal would be better o® if she could commit in advance to
promoting one agent at random. This would bring a bene¯t in terms of reduced salary
that is higher than the informational loss. However, ex post the principal has an incentive
to promote the agent with the higher output.19
6 The Observed E®ectiveness of Campaign Spending
Several authors have estimated the e®ect of campaign spending on voting behavior (for
a survey, see Levitt [23]). Various datasets and econometric methodologies have been
used. The vast majority of these studies suggest that campaign expenditures by an incum-
bent have very little in°uence on the incumbent's probability of re-election. For instance,
19A rat race e®ect has been documented by Landers, Rebitzer, and Taylor [21] for junior US lawyers.
22Levitt [22] cannot reject the null hypothesis that campaign spending has no e®ect at all
on election outcome. Although most of these studies use US data, Palda and Palda [28]
¯nd analogous results for French legislative elections.20
This section examines this somewhat surprising empirical ¯nding in the light of the
present model. As we will see, the fact that the observed e®ectiveness of campaign spending
is low has stark welfare implications.
Consider a political environment that behaves according to the game theoretical model
described so far. An external observer ignores the underlying parameters as well as the
function F(¢). The only data the observer has are election outcomes and campaign spend-
ing. Because the model is binary, only two levels of campaign spending will be observed:
0 and a¤. By regressing election outcomes on campaign spending, the observer obtains
the gross e®ectiveness of campaign spending. The e®ectiveness is called \gross" because it
overlooks the fact that spending and deadweight are determined together.21 In our binary
model the gross e®ectiveness of campaign spending consists of two election probabilities:
one when a = 0, which we denote with ª0, and one when a = a¤, which we denote with ª1.
Based on these two election probabilities, what conclusions can the observer draw about
voter welfare?
Proposition 7. Suppose that h À 0, there exists a k > 0 such that if ª1 ¡ ª0 < k then
Wn > Ws.
Proof. By Proposition 1, low-type incumbents choose a = 0 and high-types choose a = a¤.
Thus, by (20) and (23),
ª0 = e0(0) = F(g);
ª1 = e1(a
¤) = F(g + h ¡ D
¤):
Therefore, ª1 ! ª0 implies F(g + h ¡ D¤) ! F(g). The result that Wn > Ws obtains as
in the proof of Proposition 6.
The intuition for Proposition 7 is straightforward. If one observes a low gross e®ective-
ness of campaign spending, one should conclude that most of the informational bene¯t of
20Early studies based on cross-sectional data such as Jacobson [17] found that, while incumbent spending
had little e®ect, expenditures by challengers were much more e®ective. However, recent studies based on
more sophisticate approaches (such as Levitt's use of panel data) ¯nd that the e®ect of challenger spending
is almost as low as that of incumbent spending.
21I assume however that the parameter g is constant across observations. This can be achieved in panel
data such as those used by Levitt.
23spending is o®set by the deadweight needed to raise contributions. Then, it is as if voters
were faced with two types of candidates: low types with no deadweight and high types
with a deadweight which almost makes up the di®erence between a high type and a low
type. This situation is certainly worse than the situation without contributions. There,
voters are faced with `average' candidates who are superior to both a low type and a high
type with high deadweight.
In this model a low observed e®ectiveness of campaign spending does not mean that
spending is useless. Electoral expenditures still provide voters with valuable information.
Unfortunately, the deadweight cost needed to raise contributions more than o®sets the
informational bene¯t. If we observe a low e®ectiveness, we should infer that the political
system is in the rat race dilemma discussed in the end of the previous section. In such
circumstances, forbidding campaign spending improves voter welfare.
7 Conclusions
In this paper I have constructed and analyzed a model of electoral competition with interest
groups in which: (i) There are a large number of heterogeneous lobbies competing for
political favors; (ii) Lobbies are better informed than voters on the personal characteristics
of politicians; and (iii) Campaign expenditures in°uence voting behavior in a way that
is consistent with equilibrium choices of politicians and lobbies. Such a rich model can
quickly become unwieldy. Thus, I have had to make a number of simplifying assumptions,
which can hopefully be relaxed in future research.
First, challengers have been modeled in a sketchy way. There is no asymmetric infor-
mation about them. Although in reality, the bulk of campaign money goes to incumbents,
a part of it does go to challengers. It would be interesting to model the signaling role of
challenger spending as well. Prat [30] has studied the case of one lobby contributing to
two candidates, which turns out to be quite complicate. This paper has tackled the case
of several lobbies contributing to one candidate. Future research may solve the general
problem of several lobbies contributing to several candidates.
Second, both in the US and especially in Europe, campaign ¯nance is often managed by
parties. Party leaders receive contributions (whether public ¯nancing, legal private funds,
or illegal private funds) and make political expenditures on behalf of candidates of that
party. The signaling role of expenditures is mediated by the signaling role of parties (which
is studied by Caillaud and Tirole [10]). It would be important to examine the interaction
24between the two types of signals.
The main contribution of this paper is to show that it is possible to build a microfounded
model of campaign ¯nance and to draw policy implications. More work is needed to obtain
richer {but still microfounded{ models that can capture the full complexity of interest
group politics and serve as the basis to evaluate the welfare e®ect of existing or proposed
campaign regulation.
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27Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2: By (9) and (10),
^ pi ´ argmaxpi¸[c
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i (pi) + c
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i (^ pi), cR
i (pR
i ), and cR
i (pL
i ) are all nonnegative (we will check later
that this is indeed the case). Then we can disregard the nonnegativity constraints in (9)
and (10) and we have
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Provided that ¸ > 0, the statement of the lemma is proven.
It remains to check that cR
i (^ pi), cL
i (^ pi), cR
i (pR
i ), and cR
i (pL
i ) are indeed nonnegative. By
28substituting ¼R
i and ¼L
i in (34), (35), (36), and (37), we have
c
R













































i ] > 0:
By (9) and (10), this also proves that cR
i (¢) is di®erentiable on an open interval containing
^ pi and pR
i and that cL
i (¢) is di®erentiable on an open interval containing ^ pi and pL
i .
Proof of Proposition 1: Let ci(p) ´ cR
i (p) + cL
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: (40)
which shows that ¸ > 0. This is not surprising. If ¸ = 0, it means that I has no use for
marginal contributions. Thus, lobbies can reduce contributions without causing a change
in policy.


















i )2 + (kR
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:
By summing over policy dimensions, Proposition 1 is proven.
Proof of Lemma 4: Suppose that (18) holds as an equality. Then, (18) and (19) rewrite
as
½(F(g) ¡ F(g ¡ D0(a
¤))) = (1 ¡ ½)(F(g + h ¡ D1(a
¤)) ¡ F(g))
(1 ¡ ½)(F(g + h ¡ D1(a
¤)) ¡ F(g)) ¸ ½(F(g + h) ¡ F(g + h ¡ D1(a
¤)))
29or
F(g + h) ¡ F(g) · F(g + h ¡ D1(a
¤)) ¡ F(g ¡ D0(a
¤))
which is implied (because, from Proposition 1, D1(a¤) ¸ D0(a¤)) by
F(g + h) ¡ F(g) · F(g + h ¡ D1(a
¤)) ¡ F(g ¡ D1(a
¤))
The latter inequality is true because F(¢) is concave.
Proof of Proposition 3: In a pooling equilibrium, from (12), if a = 0, I's probability
of election is given by








Consider the deviation a = a0 and suppose voters (if uninformed) believe that an incumbent
with a0 must be a high type. Then,
e0(a
0) = ½F(g ¡ D0(a
0)) + (1 ¡ ½)F(g + h ¡ D1(a
0))
e1(a
0) = ½F(g + h ¡ D1(a
0)) + (1 ¡ ½)F(g + h ¡ D1(a
0))
The deviation is pro¯table for a high type but not for a low type if e0(0) ¸ e0(a0) and
e0(0) < e0(a0), which correspond to
½(F(g) ¡ F(g ¡ D0(a
0))) = (1 ¡ ½)(F(g + h ¡ D1(a




(1 ¡ ½)(F(g + h ¡ D1(a
0)) ¡ F(g +
1
2
)) ¸ ½(F(g + h) ¡ F(g + h ¡ D1(a
0)))
From this point on, the proof proceeds as in Lemma 4. It is proven that such a0 exists and,
therefore, there the pooling equilibrium does not survive the Intuitive Criterion.










+ (1 ¡ ½)F(g + h ¡ D
¤) ¡ F(g):
From the fact that F(g ¡ D0) < F(g + h ¡ D¤), we see that
@Ã
@½ < 0. Also, as both
F(g¡D0(D¤)) and F(g+h¡D¤) are decreasing in D¤,
@Ã










30From (27), we see that da¤
dD¤ > 0, which implies that
da¤
d½
=
da¤
dD¤
dD¤
d½
< 0:
31